CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.683
23 June 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 23 June 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Satish Chandra (India)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 683rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish, on behalf of the Conference, to extend a very warm welcome to the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mrs. Siri Bjerke, who will be the first speaker today. Her presence among us today testifies to the continued interest of Norway in our work.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Norway, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, Slovakia, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq.

I give the floor to Her Excellency the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mrs. Siri Bjerke.

Mrs. BJERKE (Norway): First of all, I would like to say that I feel honoured and pleased to address the Conference on Disarmament today. I would like to congratulate you, Ambassador Chandra, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference at this critical phase of the negotiations on the nuclear test ban. I would also like to thank the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Petrovsky, and the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Bensmail, for the kind assistance given to our delegation when we needed the services of the secretariat.

When Johan Jørgen Holst, the late Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed you a little over a year ago, he took as his point of departure the fact that the end of the cold war does not obviate the need for arms control and disarmament. On the contrary, he pointed out that this need is growing, but the opportunities for meeting it are also increasing. Events during the last year have proved him right.

The Conference on Disarmament, as the main multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, has taken advantage of these new opportunities and has entered into a new and important phase of activity. Negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty are well under way. The Conference has before it the Special Coordinator's report on how to proceed towards the achievement of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Further developments in the important area of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States appear possible. There is also a growing recognition of the need to establish reliable and transparent mechanisms to manage the existing and growing stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

In addressing these important tasks, we can draw encouragement from international developments. Russia's signing of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme in Brussels yesterday should be warmly welcomed. Non-proliferation and nuclear matters will be important elements in the new cooperative relationship that is being established between these former adversaries. The trilateral agreement between the United States of America, Russia and the Ukraine is being implemented as a result of a truly cooperative international effort, paving the

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way for further drastic reductions in nuclear arsenals. These developments are promising because they represent steps towards one of the basic purposes of arms control, which is to build international security based on cooperation rather than competition. But the situation on the Korean peninsula is a reminder that the spectre of nuclear proliferation continues to be with us. And although arms expenditures worldwide have been reduced, large amounts of arms continue to flow to conflict areas, causing deaths and destruction and creating difficulties for the efforts of the international community to contain and manage such conflicts through negotiations and peace-keeping.

A comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing has been a priority disarmament issue for the Norwegian Government for many years. We are geographically close to the nuclear testing grounds on Novaya Zemlya. Norwegian public opinion remains concerned about the environmental impact of nuclear testing. A comprehensive test ban will reduce the role of nuclear weapons as instruments of national and international security policy, thus reducing an incentive for proliferation. Moreover, such a treaty constitutes a reasonable quid pro quo on the part of the nuclear-weapon States in return for a firm commitment to a strong non-proliferation regime of unlimited duration. A nuclear testing ban is also an additional insurance against further nuclear degradation of the environment.

We are pleased that the unilateral moratoria on testing remain in force for the majority of the nuclear-weapon States. The recent nuclear-test explosion in China is highly regrettable. It has been met, rightly, with strong and negative reactions from the international community. We once again urge China to refrain from further testing and to join the other nuclear-weapon States in a moratorium.

The nuclear-weapon States bear the main responsibility for concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We are encouraged by the vigorous start of the negotiations and remain committed to make our contribution to the establishment of a workable and verifiable nuclear-test-ban regime. In our view, there is now a solid basis for starting work on a complete treaty text, both in terms of scope of the treaty, legal and institutional elements and the essential parts of the verification regime. There now exists a unique opportunity to achieve a CTBT which must be exploited while the political momentum is there. Negotiations should therefore be speeded up in parallel with the preparations for the NPT review conference. This would facilitate the preparatory work and contribute substantially to the outcome of the 1995 conference.

An international seismic monitoring system should form a central part of a CTBT verification regime. In order to be effective, a global system like this must have sufficient flexibility to accommodate data from any other supplementary monitoring systems that may be part of the overall verification system. In this way, the cost of establishing and operating the verification system can be kept down, without sacrificing quality or efficiency. The international verification system should be internationally funded, in order to ensure an equitable distribution of costs. International funding would avoid placing unreasonable economic burdens on countries whose participation is essential in order to

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provide adequate global coverage. It would facilitate the establishment of new seismic stations at appropriate locations. Furthermore, it would ensure that all stations and communication links could be operated to the required standards. The international data centre would be in an excellent position to negotiate favourable rates for communication links, and would be able to support a technical staff to provide cost-effective assistance to individual countries, thereby enhancing the quality and reliability of the station network.

Maximum use should be made of existing facilities, such as seismic stations and facilities for radioactivity sampling. In this way the monitoring system will benefit from investments already made and from technical capabilities that have already been established in various countries.

Norway has several of the most advanced seismic array stations in the world. The third global seismic test - the GSETT-3 experiment - will help to identify the stations in various parts of the world that are most suitable for an international monitoring system, as well as revealing where modernization and additions may be necessary. Norway will be an active participant in this important event.

We have noted with great interest the report by the Special Coordinator on the negotiations on an agreement to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and we support the view that the Conference on Disarmament is the most appropriate forum for negotiating a cut-off treaty. Such an agreement will be of particular importance in the context of proliferation, and negotiations should start as soon as possible.

We also believe it is high time to address the problem of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in connection with the process of nuclear disarmament. A ban on further production should be accompanied by reliable and transparent measures to register, manage and monitor existing stocks. We feel that the willingness of the nuclear-weapon States to address this issue is an encouraging sign.

My final point in this context is to stress the need for more effective international arrangements to assure States which do not possess nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against the use or threat of use of such weapons. The assurances given to the Ukraine in connection with the trilateral declaration might constitute a basis for more binding commitments on the part of the nuclear-weapons States on this important issue.

It is essential to translate our recognition of the need to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction into concrete action. We must strengthen the regimes that have been established to prevent nuclear proliferation. Universal adherence to the non-proliferation treaty and the indefinite extension of its provisions will be vital. We welcome the recent accessions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Georgia as non-nuclear-weapon States, and the announcement by Argentina and Algeria of their intention to accede to the Treaty before the 1995

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conference. We also strongly hope that the Ukraine will very soon become a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty in fulfilment of its commitments under the Lisbon Protocol.

The NPT remains the cornerstone in our efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and it could form the basis of a broader cooperative regime designed to prevent nuclear proliferation in all its aspects. Against this background, the attitude of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which is seeking to evade its safeguard obligations to IAEA, continues to cause widespread concern. Such conduct is a challenge to the authority of international law, multinational institutions, and the multilateral non-proliferation regime. It is of the utmost importance that this issue is settled peacefully and without further delay. We urge North Korea to reconsider its decision and cooperate fully with IAEA.

The Treaty on conventional force reductions in Europe is a cornerstone in both the European and the Atlantic security structure, and we look forward to its full and timely implementation. Ensuring the integrity of the CFE Treaty and full compliance with all its provisions remains of paramount importance.

The end of the cold war has confronted us with new opportunities, but also with new challenges. In areas where weapons of mass destruction were produced, tested and stored, the ecology has been damaged often beyond possibility of repair. To prevent further environmental degradation in consequence of a comprehensive disarmament process represents a major additional challenge. We should recognize that problems of this magnitude can only be resolved in a wider multilateral context and will require international assistance and cooperation. Norway is ready to play her part in such a joint effort. The question of how to coordinate it and how to allocate sufficient resources to deal with these new challenges is a matter which we have to address in the appropriate forums.

Finally, I would like to repeat that Norway is still awaiting the extension of the Conference on Disarmament, may I say awaiting it with growing impatience. This issue is a test case for the adaptability of the CD to new international realities. Our security agenda is more complex than ever before. Future security depends on a mixture of regional and global initiatives and measures and the CD bears the main responsibility for the global part of that equation. We believe that bringing in new members at this juncture will provide the Conference on Disarmament with even greater legitimacy and credibility, thereby enabling it to function more effectively as the principal custodian of the aspirations of the international community in the field of disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway for her important statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair, to the Secretary-General of the Conference, the Deputy Secretary-General and the secretariat. I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Ambassador Ho.

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Mr. HO (Republic of Korea): First of all, allow me to extend to you, Mr. President, my warmest congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference. I am confident that your professional skills and leadership will be instrumental in making the Conference successful. You are assured of the full support and cooperation of my delegation in the fulfilment of your important duties. I would also like to extend my sincere appreciation to the preceding President, Ambassador Boytha of Hungary, for his productive performance during the initial part of the second session of this year.

I am taking the floor today to elaborate on my Government's position concerning major pending issues before this multilateral disarmament negotiating body. With the cold war era drawn to a close and a new world order beginning to take shape, the dynamics of arms control and disarmament have proven to be fruitful under the prevailing climate of reconciliation and cooperation. The post-cold-war world is characterized by two seemingly contradictory phenomena: on the one hand, fragmentation; on the other, growing globalization. This is associated with the emergence of a multi-pronged number of major Powers as well as a multiplicity of medium-sized and smaller countries in international forums. My Government is of the view that nuclear non-proliferation and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons are the primary concerns of the post-cold-war era. Indeed, nuclear disarmament will continue to remain one of the most significant centre-pieces in the maintenance of world peace and security in the decades to come.

Turning our attention to the situation in north-east Asia, the nuclear issue involving the DPRK has emerged as the most serious security concern in the region. Pyongyang's failure to comply with its obligations under the DPRK-IAEA safeguards agreement is feared to endanger peace and security in the region and to undermine global efforts for further strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

My Government is of the view that the nuclear issue should be settled without further delay due to the following considerations. First, failure to solve the issue might pose a serious threat to the NPT and, in particular, to the IAEA safeguards regime. Second, this issue is expected to have serious implications for the security and stability of north-east Asia. Unless resolved, it could cause a costly and destabilizing arms race in the region. Third, the credibility of international organizations might be undermined with a damaging proliferation precedent set.

I would like to reiterate the basic position of my Government concerning this issue. First, the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is essential for ensuring peace and security in north-east Asia and the world at large. My Government remains very clear in its commitment under the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula which was signed in full agreement between the two sides in 1992. Second, we urge North Korea again to fulfil its obligations under the safeguards agreement so that IAEA can verify non-diversion

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of nuclear material. Third, any possibility of nuclear weapons proliferation on the Korean peninsula should be eliminated.

It is my Government's firm belief that the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to the process of nuclear disarmament, and to the enhancement of international peace and security. This treaty should be of a universal, multilateral and effectively verifiable nature. In this regard, my Government reaffirms its fullest support for the early conclusion of the ongoing negotiation on the comprehensive test-ban trea y (CTBT). At the same time, my delegation extends its deep appreciation to the NTB Ad Hoc Committee and its two subsidiary working groups for their unswerving efforts to make substantive progress in the negotiation of the CTBT. It is widely believed that the early conclusion of the CTBT would provide positive momentum for the successful extension of the NPT next year. With this in mind, I would like to make some preliminary comments on the major issues relating to the CTBT negotiations.

My delegation is of the view that the draft structural outline of the CTBT, tabled by the Australian delegation in CD/1235, seems to provide an appropriate and well-balanced basis for the development of structured negotiations on the CTBT.

The CTBT should play a constructive role in further strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime in a non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable manner. My delegation holds the view that the treaty should define its scope in simple, straightforward and general terms. In this sense, the wording tabled by the Swedish delegation in its draft treaty (CD/1232) seems to be appropriate; that is, any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion should be prohibited irrespective of the purpose. However, the treaty should not contain any ambiguous wording that could be interpreted as restricting research and scientific activities for peaceful purposes.

The verification system under the CTBT should be sufficiently reliable, effectively verifiable and cost-effective. Indeed, the verification system constitutes a key component of the CTBT regime. The CTBT verification system should be based upon an evolutionary approach. The verification system should be complemented by a package of seismic and non-seismic technologies. It is widely believed that seismic verification will form the core of the CTBT regime, and that a number of other non-seismic techniques will be needed to complement seismic verification. In addition, it should include on-site inspection activities in an effort to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness to the maximum.

In order to secure the effectiveness of the CTBT regime, my delegation considers it should attract the universal adherence of all States. It is our desire that all States with nuclear weapons, and all those States with the capability to develop nuclear explosive devices, accede to the CTBT regime. This

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will ensure its universality. However, we should prevent possibilities of the entry into force of the CTBT becoming hostage to a few States.

For the purpose of securing universal, non-discriminatory and effective compliance, a series of strict sanction measures should be devised within the framework of the United Nations. In this connection, I would like to reiterate my Government's concern about the recent nuclear tests made by the People's Republic of China. My Government attaches great importance to all nuclear States observing a moratorium on nuclear testing while negotiations for conclusion of the CTBT are in process.

The year 1995 will mark a watershed in international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons as it is in that year that a conference will be convened to decide whether the NPT shall remain in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period of time.

My Government has faithfully observed the provisions of the NPT since its accession to the Treaty in 1975. Regardless of its discriminatory nature, the Treaty has contributed to the prevention of both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, we hope that the NPT will be indefinitely extended in 1995, and that the NPT regime will be thoroughly reviewed and every effort will be made to improve the Treaty by strengthening the present nuclear safeguards system through reinforcement of its inspection regime in particular. We hope furthermore that efforts will be made to lessen its discriminatory nature and that nuclear-weapons States will continue their efforts for substantial nuclear disarmament. By doing so, the NPT would be assured of remaining a cornerstone for building a more peaceful and secure world. We should also seek to facilitate further the transfer of nuclear technology and information for peaceful purposes. My Government will continue to participate actively in the discussions of the preparatory committee for the 1995 NPT Conference, and will focus its efforts on extending and strengthening the NPT regime.

My Government has faithfully implemented the obligations and duties under the biological weapons Convention since it acceded to the Convention in 1987. My Government has never undertaken to develop, produce, or stockpile biological weapons, and is not in possession of these weapons. Nor does it intend to develop them in the future. In view of the growing importance of research and development activities in the field of biotechnology, particularly genetic engineering, my Government wishes to exchange and share relevant information and experiences with other countries.

In an effort to strengthen the BWC regime, the establishment of its verification mechanism has long been urgently sought. In this connection, we share the view that a practical and realistic way of dealing with this problem is to adopt the final report on the further strengthening of the verification protocol and other pertinent matters. We believe that the creation of such a verification mechanism would be an effective means to promote increased adherence

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by non-party States to the Convention. We wish to emphasize that the CBMs adopted last September at the fourth session of the AD Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures From a Scientific and Technical Standpoint (VEREX) should be further respected and strengthened as an interim measure pending the establishment of an effective and dependable verification regime.

With regard to cut-off issues, I would also like to convey the sincere appreciation of my delegation to Ambassador Shannon and his delegation for making a dedicated effort to launch a new round of disarmament negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral, international and verifiable cut-off treaty. My delegation firmly believes that a cut-off treaty will constitute one of the centre pillars of a comprehensive and global non-proliferation regime. Taking into account the fact that the cut-off treaty will be expected to play a significant role in the further strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, I would like to make clear that my delegation will be ready to provide its full support for the successful negotiation of the treaty in the coming months ahead. In the process of the negotiation, the highest priority should be placed on securing universality and effectiveness. For this priority to be realized, as many States as possible must participate in the treaty, and at the same time a more effective and legally binding verification regime should be devised and institutionalized in concrete and clear terms. In this connection, my delegation would like to draw the attention of all States concerned to the significance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This use should be guaranteed to the maximum possible unless international nuclear safeguards are neglected and violated.

With regard to the issue of expanding the CD membership, my delegation would like to urge once again that all member States of the CD focus their attention on seeking a solution to this issue without further delay. They should also reconsider any counter-productive and undesirable linkages to other specific political concerns not directly related to the CD. In this regard, my delegation would like to extend its full support to Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil, as a Friend of the Chair in this matter, in all his endeavours for a successful conclusion of his work with the firm belief that his outstanding diplomatic skills and experience will guarantee a successful result.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Ho for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me and to my predecessor, Ambassador Boytha. I now give the floor to the representative of South Africa, Ambassador Eksteen.

Mr. EKSTEEN (South Africa): Mr. President, it gives me great pleasure to see you presiding over the Conference. It is also a particular privilege to address the Conference under the presidency of a country with which my own has a unique historical association. So many bonds of kinship exist between us. Yours is also a country with which we are at this very moment engaged in the rewarding task of re-establishing old ties and the forging of new ones. May I also convey our felicitations to the Secretary-General of the Conference?

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In a few hours' time in New York a South African delegation will return to its seat in the General Assembly for the first time since November 1974. This important event will bring to a close South Africa's period of isolation from the international community. Now that this final barrier has been removed, South Africa looks forward to being able to offer something from its experiences to the international community.

I am taking the floor today in order to inform the Conference of the policy of South Africa towards disarmament matters. Uppermost in our approach to these matters is our determination to discharge our responsibilities to the international community in the collective effort to secure progressive disarmament. Within our own borders, our Government and people are determined to banish from our national life all that which makes for war and armed conflict. Thus, in the years to come the hallmark of South African policy will be a responsible and cooperative approach to the many varied questions of disarmament and non-proliferation. In executing this policy we shall continue to support the efforts of the international community towards furthering disarmament and securing assurances against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Within our capabilities we shall endeavour to contribute to all multilateral disarmament initiatives.

The Government is determined to honour all South Africa's obligations which derive from its international commitments in the field of disarmament, including such agreements as may regulate the movement of equipment and technology which can be used in the production of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. A short list of steps which South Africa has already taken to give effect to its disarmament and non-proliferation policy is as follows. The Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act became law on 16 August 1993. This Act is the cornerstone of South Africa's policy towards disarmament. It provides for the establishment of a statutory body, the Council for the Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. This Council controls the use, export, import, transit, etc. of all dual-use equipment and technology. South Africa is a State party to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, the chemical weapons Convention (CWC) and the biological weapons Convention (BWC). South Africa has demonstrated its interest in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). We have indicated that we shall in the interim implement the provisions of the MTCR as if we were a member. South Africa has joined the Zanger Committee which regulates the movement of dual-use material and equipment which can be used in the production of nuclear weapons. We have indicated that we would accept an invitation to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which has a similar function. We attended the last plenary session of the NSG as observers. South Africa has and will continue to participate in the Preparatory Commission for the 1995 conference of NPT parties. We favour the extension of the Treaty. South Africa is an active participant in the Preparatory Commission and other meetings of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. South Africa participated in the VEREX meetings of the biological weapons Convention which had the task of identifying verification measures for the Convention. We

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are also participating in the BWC's confidence-building measures which are administered by the United Nations. South Africa is actively engaged in negotiations aimed at finalizing a treaty for an African nuclear-weapon-free zone - a treaty long the dream of so many African nations.

Mr. President, you will permit me to elaborate on this last point. As a result of South Africa's clear commitment to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, we were invited to participate in the work of the Group of Experts which was designated by the United Nations in consultation with OAU, to draft such a treaty. The work of this Group has now been completed. Their draft will in due course be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly and to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity. South Africa, like other African States, favours an appropriate treaty, which we see as complementary to and strengthening the NPT. We hope that all African States will be able to participate in making this treaty a reality soon. The interest of the nuclear Powers in the successful operation of this treaty could help convince those States which may still be hesitant that it is also their safety which will be guaranteed. It is our view that, because so many disparate interests will be gathered into the ambit of the treaty, a useful precedent will be created. When completed, the new treaty could serve as an example to other regions where the maintenance of international peace and security might be threatened.

Let me now turn to matters of direct concern to this Conference. South Africa fully supports the work of the Conference on Disarmament. As a valuable arena we regard it as the principal multilateral negotiating forum for the generation of disarmament initiatives. We therefore hope to see its work expanded in future. As an observer, South Africa is greatly encouraged by the energy and enthusiasm with which negotiations towards a nuclear-test-ban treaty are proceeding. We pledge our continued cooperation in the work of the verification experts. We also fully support the efforts of Ambassador Shannon in his consultations to find an appropriate way of beginning negotiations for a possible instrument prohibiting the production of fissionable materials. We hope that, in the not too distant future, both the CTBT and the cut-off treaty will be seen as milestones on the road to complete nuclear disarmament.

As regards transparency in armaments, we welcome the recent initiative of the Romanian delegation. We are studying with great interest the proposals for a code of conduct for international transfers of conventional arms. My delegation attaches particular importance to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. South Africa wishes to demonstrate its international standing as a responsible manufacturer and marketer of conventional arms. Careful thought is given to the export of armaments. Decisions on the export of armaments and other military equipment are made on the basis of, inter alia, the following criteria: existence of any United Nations sanctions, especially those under Chapter VII of the Charter, against any proposed recipient; a country's human rights record; whether the armaments in question could be used to suppress the local population or be used by insurgents; whether the armaments could be

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used to suppress aspirations to establish a democracy; the impact that weapon sales to one or more countries in a region could have on South Africa's relations in that region; the impact that weapons sales would have on South Africa's bilateral relations with other countries not in that specific region; and the possibility that arms sales to a country could be detrimental to, or otherwise affect, the balance of power in a region.

South Africa has observed with interest the deliberations of the Group of Governmental Experts to Prepare the Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons. In March this year South Africa joined the international effort led by the United Nations to rid the world of land-mines. From that date a moratorium was placed on the export and international marketing of land-mines. Serious consideration is at present being given to South Africa's becoming a party to the Convention and its protocols. South Africa has developed advanced technologies for the "lifting" and disposal of land-mines. This technology is a significant advance on the hand-held equipment which is usually used. The primary benefits are in the speed and safety with which land-mines buried underground are traced and then destroyed. We have entered into discussions with several countries, as well as the United Nations itself, about South African participation in international efforts to remove the land-mines which have become a scourge in many countries.

It has now become customary that the representatives of observer States which are applicant members of the Conference address the question of their pending membership. In keeping with this regrettably still necessary practice, I wish to reiterate South Africa's commitment to seeking a solution to the impasse which is frustrating a significant number of countries eager to play a constructive and more meaningful role in the full range of activities of this Conference. Much energy has already been expanded by so many in all kinds of endeavours to overcome this obstacle. How much more will have to be spent? Would the Conference not be better served by having all these efforts channelled and focused on the real issues of substance before it? We are convinced that the Conference will be better off with the States in the Group of 23 participating as full members. Even now the full members of this Conference will not find the prospective members lacking in enthusiasm to be part of their initiatives and deliberations. However, while our collective disappointment continues, South Africa shall cooperate fully with the other applicant members and also with Ambassador Lampreia in arriving at an early solution to this issue. While on a bilateral basis we shall continue to convey to interested parties our desire to have this issue resolved, we must also, in this forum, urge the members of the Conference to resolve the matter soon.

South Africa endorses the view of many other delegations that the credibility and work of the Conference should not be allowed to suffer because of the unrepresentative nature of its membership. With the work of the Conference expected to increase in future, we hope that the long overdue increase in its

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membership would not only assist the Conference in making progress on its current agenda but also allow it to take on the additional tasks it may set itself.

In conclusion, may I offer you, Mr. President, and your successors the complete cooperation of my delegation? We wish the Conference well in its important deliberations, now and in the future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Eksteen for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to the Chair and to the Secretary-General. I am also deeply touched by the warm sentiments expressed by him on the links between his great country and mine. These sentiments are fully shared and reciprocated by my country. I would now like to give the floor to the representative of Slovakia, Ambassador Kubis.

Mr. KUBIS (Slovakia): Mr. President, let me use this opportunity to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the CD. I am convinced that your abilities and your experience will make a very efficient contribution to the work of the CD. I should like, at the same time, to assure you, as well as Secretary-General of the CD Mr. Petrovsky, of the full support of the Slavak delegation. May I also thank your predecessor - Ambassador György Boytha of Hungary - for his skilful and tireless efforts and diplomatic abilities which he proved so many times during his tenure of presidency?

The years 1994 and 1995 are of fundamental importance for global disarmament efforts. We find ourselves at the threshold of a new era. We must not miss the chance. My country strongly supports the earliest conclusion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty. It would be a significant contribution to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime based on the NPT and at the same time it would be an important step towards nuclear disarmament as our ultimate goal. Having this in mind we believe that the treaty should ban all nuclear explosions without any exclusion. The ban should be comprehensive and universal. It should prohibit all nuclear tests by all States in all environments and for ever.

Let me use this floor to voice an appeal that all nuclear-weapon States join the moratorium on nuclear tests and contribute in this way to speedy and successful progress in our common endeavours.

The Slovak Republic understands that there will be no confidence in the test-ban treaty without it being supported by a reliable verification system. The verification system should be global, non-discriminatory and efficient. It must provide sufficient guarantees of compliance with the treaty and if necessary be able to detect, locate and identify any violator. My country supports the endeavours undertaken by the Group of Seismic Experts, which has accumulated knowledge and experience in the field of possible verification systems for nuclear testing. Results from two global monitoring tests concluded by various seismic stations around the world have to be learned carefully and implemented into an appropriate scheme for the future verification regime. We support the

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idea of a global compliance monitoring network based on the three-environments verification package complemented by findings of national technical means. We consider complementing of the said network by on-site inspections indispensable. We see a role for an international organization, either independent or under the aegis of IAEA, to collect, process and distribute the acquired data, at the same time favouring a reasonably small, efficient and highly cost-effective verification mechanism.

My country supports a pragmatic and evolutionary verification system which should remain open for inclusion of new methods at later stages. We should also bear in mind that the necessity to create an utmost effective verification system should not become a reason for delaying the conclusion of the treaty.

Entry-into-force procedure of the CTBT should not be complicated and causing delays. The treaty should enter into force as soon as possible, i.e. after being ratified by a reasonable and representative number of countries, including all nuclear-weapon States.

As I already stated, speedy progress in the negotiations and success in concluding the CTBT would be a positive signal facilitating a significant extension of the expiring NPT. We consider the extension of the NPT (for an indefinite period of time) an act of utmost importance and a precondition of creating a curb for nuclear proliferation and accelerating further progress on the road toward complete and comprehensive nuclear disarmament. Indefinite extension of the NPT at the 1995 review and extension conference will be vital to ensuring that the declared nuclear Powers take steps to fulfil article VI of the NPT.

The world has changed in the last couple of years. However, military doctrines, in particular those for the first use of nuclear weapons, do not reflect this change. The danger of nuclear catastrophe is not any longer of a bipolar character. We understand that responsibility for nuclear security has to be shared by all, nuclear and non-nuclear States, but evidently, the first step should be taken by the nuclear Powers.

It was said many times that the best guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, we realize that for the time being we at least have to adopt steps providing for effective international measures to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We expect the nuclear-weapon States to provide to all other States negative security assurances in a universal, non-discriminatory, legally binding form. The negative assurances would simultaneously be an essential element for an effective regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We hope that the present consultation on the cut-off of fissile material production for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices will produce an agreement on the mandate for negotiations on a convention prohibiting production

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of fissile material for weapons purposes. We do share the view that the CD is the right forum for these negotiations and we support the establishment of an appropriate ad hoc committee.

Another area in which there is a lot of work to be done by the CD is outer space or, better to say, the core of the problem - prevention of an arms race in it. The existing space treaties are a positive step but they are not sufficient. More must be done to achieve the ultimate goal. New and promising ideas were tabled and we hope that they will evolve into a comprehensive international document tangibly promoting arms race prevention and effectively guaranteeing the exclusively peaceful utilization of outer space.

My country supports the idea to elaborate a comprehensive approach to confidence-building measures in outer space. Presentations made by various experts during the last three years represent, in our view, a solid basis for a determined discussion on ways and means how to improve the existing legal regime of various outer space agreements.

The United Nations, the CD and other bodies have dealt with the issue of conventional weapons for several decades. The last few years proved it is the right time to pluck some fruits. Significant achievements were reached within some regional organizations - let me mention the CSCE Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe - as well as by the United Nations itself.

It is of our vital interest to safeguard the integrity and inviolability of the CFE Treaty, especially in the process of harmonization of obligations concerning arms control, disarmament and confidence-building and security-building within CSCE, which should be completed at the end of the full implementation of the CFE Treaty in November 1996. We look forward to the upcoming end of the second reduction phase of the CFE Treaty with the deep conviction that all signatories of the Treaty will fulfil their commitments.

The establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was a revolutionary step. The potential of the Register as a confidence-building measure through increased openness and transparency is enormous.

The Slovak Republic welcomed the establishment of the Register as an important means to address the problem of excessive and destabilizing transfers. As a strong supporter of the Register we did not miss the chance to participate in the exercise from the very first year. The Slovak Republic favours further development of the Register by its strengthening and expanding.

The first year of the functioning of the United Nations Register was an encouraging start, revealing a number of transfers not previously known to the international community. Nevertheless, the rather limited participation in the exercise by States cannot be considered satisfactory. The Register will lose much of its raison d'etre unless we manage to secure universal adherence. Failing to do so will jeopardize the future participation of States and undermine

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all efforts aimed at the expansion of the scope of the Register. Having in mind that, we consider securing the universality of the Register extremely vital. In order to ensure the full viability of the Register the Slovak Republic also welcomed and supports its strengthening through regional arrangements as was done by the decision of the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation in February 1993 committing the participating States to submit the required information in due time.

The Slovak delegation believes that proper attention should be paid by all States to the proposal to elaborate an international code of conduct for transfers of conventional arms tabled by Romania. In our view, in spite of the long way to go, the code of conduct has a potential to establish viable universal and non-discriminatory principles and criteria to regulate internationals arms transfers. These regulations could significantly help to limit the potential growth of regional tension and instability.

The Slovak Republic supports the aims and orientations of the proposal tabled by eight delegations containing a means of dealing with the interrelated aspects of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms. We share the view that widening the scope of the Register by including data on military holdings and procurement through national production would desirably increase openness and transparency in the field of conventional armaments. Inclusion of the data would provide for a much more complete assessment of States' overall military capability. In this way the expansion of the Register would vitally promote its function as a confidence-building measure.

The Slovak Republic is also ready to fully participate in a potential exchange of information on the organizational structure and size of armed forces, which is a complementary element to the information on conventional armaments and military budgets.

In this respect the Slovak Republic has also committed itself within the CSCE framework to provide transparency about its intentions in the medium and long term as regards the size, structure, training and equipment of its armed forces, as well as its defence policy, doctrine and budgets thereto. Transparency in defence planning will considerably help in revealing possible excessive and destabilizing arms build-ups which could pose a threat to national, regional and international peace and security.

At the same time we also here should not negate opinions saying that we should not move too fast and too far. This makes us consider carefully proposals for expansion of the Register on weapons of mass destruction. In our opinion the production, transfer and possession of weapons of mass destruction are the subject of prohibition or regulation by other international instruments. We even do not believe that establishing a register would stop the perpetrators, if any, in violating these instruments.

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We believe that the enriched and strengthened Register has an important role to play as one of the tools of an early warning system, contributing thus to the efforts of the international community in the field of preventive diplomacy.

Notwithstanding the great importance of the Register as a method of building confidence, let me remark that transparency is not an end in itself. It must not become a substitute for genuine disarmament measures. The painful issue of the expansion of the membership of the CD has become a latent problem. The CD is a central multilateral negotiating body of the international community dealing with the issues of disarmament. This characteristic makes the expansion problem still graver. There is a large number of countries that are interested in contributing to the CD's work, but, unfortunately, due to the lack of consensus they are not able to become its full-rights members. We share the view that this problem must be settled in a satisfactory manner, as soon as possible, regardless of the procedural way chosen, probably through a step-by-step approach starting with the Group of 23, so that the CD membership reflects the current geopolitical situation and needs of the forthcoming arms control and disarmament tasks.

Let me at this point stress once again also the specific interest of the Slovak Republic in full membership in the CD, also due to the fact that we consider ourselves a de facto successor of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the original member of the Conference on Disarmament. It is frustrating to note that, in spite of all the political support for the way the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic managed their divorce, in spite of the agreement of these two successors of the Czech and Slovak Republic that Slovakia is to take the place of the CSFR in the CD, this body was unable to transform words of support into deeds.

According to our opinion the CD must be able to adapt itself to its new tasks also in and through expeditious dealing with the question of its composition. We appeal to all the CD members to stop undermining the CD's political and substantive credibility through its inability to move forward in solving the question of its extension of its universality.

Let me conclude, Mr. President, by wishing all success to you, as well as the ad hoc committee chairmen, coordinators and Friends of the Chair and to all of you, esteemed colleagues, since this is most probably also my last statement here during my current term of duty in Geneva.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Kubis for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair, to Ambassador Boytha and to the Secretary-General. It gives me pleasure now to give the floor to Ambassador Nasseri of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. NASSERI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, it is a source of utmost pleasure to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference. Your quality of leadership coupled with your exceptional diplomatic experience deserves only unqualified support and that, I am sure, is precisely

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what you shall continue to receive from the CD as a whole and most certainly from my delegation. I should also congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Boytha of Hungary, for the excellent manner he conducted our work in the Conference.

Today I intend to address some of the aspects of the issues that we are dealing with at the current stage. A busy agenda prevails on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Various aspects of this issue have become clearly identified following years of discussions and deliberations. As a result, all elements to start a serious negotiating process are now readily available. Yet the Ad Hoc Committee remains sterilized as the essential ingredient of political will is still absent.

Today space is threatened more than ever and more than anywhere. Vast amounts of expenditures are still attributed to the continuation of the arms race in space. Here the major Powers have assumed a monopoly and compete in a devastating campaign to gain supremacy and superiority in space.

No prospect to bring this arms race under control is within the line of sight. The 1967 space Treaty prohibits only the deployment of MDW weapons on the Moon and other celestial bodies. The 1974 Convention is limited only to the registration of space objects "as soon as practicable". Neither one addresses the arms race in its real sense. What is witnessed instead is that military satellites have polluted space. Anti-satellite weapons, including beam weapons, have been developed incessantly, constituting a serious threat against the peaceful utilization of space.

The two-track approach of the Ad Hoc Committee, dividing the discussions into CBMs on one side and terminology and legal aspects on the other, did not meet our full agreement from the outset. None the less we believe that the opportunity created by general agreement on the approach should be seized. Hence we expect the Committee to enter into the negotiation phase immediately.

Negotiations to conclude a treaty prohibiting the production and development of anti-satellite weapons and their destruction, deservedly promoted in the last stages of the cold war, and which have mysteriously been slipped under the carpet ever since, should be reinvigorated. The Ad Hoc Committee can now focus on negotiations either for conclusion of such a treaty or for amendment of the 1967 outer space treaty. This, of course, constitutes only a first step, leaving scores of other issues to be dealt with at later stages.

On confidence-building we should first attempt to complete information that the States must provide on the basis of the 1974 Convention. The information collected, thus far, is not sufficient. We support, in this context, the proposal forwarded by France and Argentina while underlining that the information should be submitted prior to the launching of space objects. The information should also be extended to cover space objects launched prior to 1974 in order to ensure full transparency. The discussions in the outer space Ad Hoc Committee

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have unfortunately been limited to expression of general positions and are apparently not about to take the shape of real negotiations.

The same is true in the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances. After 15 years of general debate it is incomprehensible that we cannot yet engage in actual negotiations. This year we should begin to work and concentrate on a rolling text. I wish to express my gratitude for the constructive attitude of the German and Italian delegations on this issue. The German proposal with some modifications can particularly contribute to the preparation of the rolling text.

As the 1995 NPT review conference is nearing we reiterate, once again, that tangible results should come in sight on NSA negotiations. Indeed the conclusion of a treaty on NSA will have a decisive role on the outcome of the NPT review conference. Unilateral statements do not sufficiently serve this purpose. As the nuclear-weapon States have committed themselves to the second protocol of Tlatelolco, they should also be prepared to make similar commitments on a global basis and particularly as regards non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT.

On transparency in armaments it is encouraging to note that a large number of States, my country included, have already provided data to the United Nations arms registry. At the same time we cannot underestimate the fact that, in some areas, nearly an entire region has been hesitant to come forward with such information. We, for our part, have persistently stressed the need for a regional approach to TIA. This has been reiterated in the General Assembly resolutions. The issue is also on the agenda of discussions within the Ad Hoc Committee.

We need to underline in this context that simple political statements will not be sufficient to effectively encourage participation in the registry. What is needed is to promote debate and discussions at appropriate levels within the regions in order to enhance confidence and coordination and provide regional mechanisms for States to follow in their provision of the information.

A major question in this regard remains as to the role of the CD in discussions on TIA versus the expert Group which continues its work in New York. The expert Group has been established through a selection process for its members that has been completely non-transparent and continues its discussions behind closed doors.

Any discussion on transparency should, as a matter of principle, be transparent itself. A summed-up report at the end, devoid of the full context of discussions and debates, cannot be sufficient for an appropriate evaluation. Unfortunately the agreement to send a letter presenting the balanced views of the members of the CD was also severely mishandled, eroding further the confidence so essential for constructive discussions on this issue.

The role of the CD, therefore, must be clearly identified and distinguished in order to allow progress on this issue. As the sole multilateral forum for

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disarmament negotiations the CD must become the principal body for TIA deliberations. The expert Group should make its membership more representative and balanced and make its discussions fully transparent and should, eventually, prepare its report for consideration by the Conference on Disarmament.

As regards the scope of the discussions, clarifications are needed on military holdings and what they should contain. The underlying objective of transparency in armaments is to identify excessive and destabilizing accumulation of armaments. Therefore exchange of information on military holdings is necessary as recognized in the United Nations General Assembly resolution. This objective also requires that such exchange of information be inclusive of military holdings outside territories as well as bilateral and multilateral military and defence commitments and arrangements.

On transfer of high technology much discussion has taken place. The United Nations General Assembly resolution has referred to transparency as a package. There cannot be any reasonable and balanced package envisaged without a clear mechanism for transparency on export control regimes. This transparency can start by submission of relevant domestic legislation, information on areas of control, details of control for each State, the political and legal basis used to justify the control regimes exercised by various clubs along with their internal structure and procedures of decision-making and their future plans and policies.

The UNDC discussions on this issue offered much promise at the outset but after three years resulted in failure. This will no doubt cast a heavy shadow on continuation of discussions on TIA.

There was also a failure last year, at the General Assembly, to agree on a resolution on chemical weapons. Whereas the United Nations was able to produce consensus resolutions at times that much controversy and rivalry prevailed, such failure after the conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention was far from expected. It was not conceivable that the chemically developed States would refuse to accept the inclusion of a commitment already agreed to in the Convention on peaceful use and technological cooperation in the resolution and prefer instead to withdraw the resolution altogether.

The preparatory work at The Hague which has otherwise been progressing steadily is also now regressing as discussions on the well-known article XI of the Convention have become stalemated. Model legislation proposed by Australia, there, has included provisions which not only confirm the continuation of restrictions imposed by the Australia Group but also extend its scope of applications. What is at stake is technological development of the developing countries, particularly those who have committed themselves to various non-proliferation and disarmament treaties and conventions.

Transparency is also the key issue for upcoming negotiations on prohibition of fissile materials for weapons purposes and explosive devices, referred to, inappropriately in our view, as cut-off. The fact is that there is very little

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information available on this matter. Credible institutions such as SIPRI have also heavily underlined this serious shortcoming. It is hard to perceive any meaningful negotiations with so much secrecy surrounding the subject. Information is particularly in immediate need in the following areas. First, the amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, fissile and fissionable materials used for military purposes. Second, the portion of these materials which will become available as the result of destruction of nuclear weapons under various disarmament and arms limitation and arms reduction treaties. Third, the amount of plutonium produced as reactor fuels and the amount of HEU existing in civil sectors. Fourth, plutonium and HEU that remain outside the safeguard system in non-nuclear-weapons States.

This information will also help to curb the possibility of illegal transfer of such materials for military purposes. An international registry may be established for collection of information and data on fissile materials as spelled out above.

We must also note that the prohibition of fissile materials for weapons purposes overlaps with the NPT. The non-nuclear-weapons States have already made commitments to this end in that context. We are concerned that initiation of negotiations for a separate new treaty at this stage may influence the possibility of joining the NPT by threshold States in an adverse manner. The more proper approach, in our view, is to amend the NPT such that it would include commitments from all States, nuclear-weapons States and threshold States in addition to non-nuclear-weapons States. This approach would also serve to redress the prevailing substantial imbalance in the NPT.

The nuclear-weapons States and, more specifically, the United States and countries of the former Soviet Union possess 99 per cent of fissile materials for weapons purposes. They as well as the threshold States can move to put such materials under IAEA safeguards now that they are seemingly committed to a ban on fissile materials.

We are in full support of early establishment of an ad hoc committee to address all aspects of this issue. We do need, however, to agree on a mandate for this purpose. This mandate must include an explicit reference to the current stockpiles dispersed in different parts of the world. One cannot envisage an eventual agreement on prohibition of fissile materials which leave huge amounts of the existing unsafeguarded materials untouched. Even non-proliferation, much less disarmament, cannot be achieved in that case.

The mandate should also leave the option open for the eventual outcome of negotiations to become part of, or be attached to, the NPT rather than constitute a separate treaty; hence promote universal adherence to a more balanced, more comprehensive, non-proliferation Treaty.

In my previous statement at the plenary, I addressed various aspects of negotiations on the CTBT. Many of those issues have now been discussed in detail

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preparing the basis for a rolling text which the Chairman, Ambassador Marín Bosch, is about to present.

One important issue that we must focus upon and find an agreement relates to the scope of the treaty. It is essential that non-explosive explosions or so-called laboratory tests be included in the scope in order to close the door on these possible options that may remain open for advanced nuclear States. The predominant legal opinion holds that the formulation included, in this context, in the PTBT does not cover the above-mentioned tests. An explicit and direct reference, therefore, is necessary within the text of the CTBT.

We also emphasize, once again, that the existing nuclear test sites must be included in the scope. We are pleased to note that a large number of members have underlined the significance of this issue. My delegation has presented a working paper in this regard which shall be followed by further details at an appropriate time in the negotiations.

A critical decision is also needed on the approach for verification. There is general concurrence that the CTBT should be concluded at the earliest possible time for reasons that are clear for all of us. The discussions on possible complementary methods of verification have been useful as they have been both illustrative and highly informative. What we can conclude from these discussions is that the only way to arrive at an early conclusion of the CTBT is to establish the verification mechanism on the basis of the exiting seismic verification technique and on-site inspection including monitoring of the nuclear test sites.

The non-seismic complementary techniques, on the other hand, may not become operational for years to come. Even the radionuclide technique, which is generally perceived as a possible feasible verification mechanism, requires at least three years, on the basis of conclusion of discussions held by Dr. Marshall, Friend of the Chair on non-seismic methods, to be operationalized.

In the working paper that my delegation forwarded on this issue, we also explained that non-seismic techniques relate to testing in other environments generally included in the PTBT. As no violation of PTBT has been registered, so far, it is both prudent and safe, at this stage, to limit ourselves to a general agreement on modalities of non-seismic techniques with the understanding that an agreement on any of these techniques, in later stages, will lead to their inclusion as a complementary verification technique in the future.

As regards the structural and legal issues we should certainly avoid a complicated bureaucracy. Therefore an executive council is not at all necessary and decisions may be made by the conference of the States parties or the committee of the whole as Japan has proposed.

For the entry into force of the Treaty the numbers are not so important as the categories of States are. All nuclear-weapons States as well as threshold States must join for the EIF to be realized. At the same time, we cannot

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overlook the possibility that the fate of the treaty may become hostage to a refusal by one or a few countries to join. We cannot allow the possibility of a veto. This matter may only be resolved through the provision of incentives within the treaty for States to join through, inter alia, facilitating technical and scientific cooperation in peaceful areas and disincentives in the form of punitive measures for those who opt to remain outside the treaty.

On the issue of withdrawal we need to have clear provisions for any measures and consequences that might follow. The experience of the NPT and other treaties have proven that countries receive drastically different treatments in such circumstances. Israel, for instance, which has stayed outside the NPT and pursued the development of nuclear weapons contrary to the basic objectives of the NPT, has received favourable treatment consistently and has been extensively assisted. North Korea, on the other hand, is under close scrutiny and tremendous international pressure because of its withdrawal from the NPT. What is intended here, of course, is to stress the prevalence of extreme selectivity without prejudice to our principled positions on each of these two issues.

The CTBT must, therefore, lay out clear procedures to ensure an even-handed, non-selective approach in cases of withdrawal. The same disincentives and punitive measures envisaged for States who remain outside the treaty should also apply to States who withdraw. A special provision is required none the less for nuclear-weapons States and other nuclear advanced countries. As punitive measures cannot be a real disincentive for them, withdrawal of these States or their remaining outside the treaty will be tantamount to the nullification of the treaty as a whole and should be disallowed.

My delegation shall continue to participate actively in the negotiations of the Ad Hoc Committee with the view and hope that the treaty would be finalized before the 1995 NPT conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Nasseri for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me and to Ambassador Boytha. I now give the floor to the representative of Iraq, Mr. Mohammed Hussein.

Mr. HUSSEIN (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and to seize this opportunity to express my own hopes, together with those of my country's delegation, for your success in directing the work of this Conference. That success would also represent a success for your own great country, India, which is linked to my country by ties of friendship that have their roots in history.

Although we are meeting here in the framework of a conference specializing in issues of disarmament, the higher objective of this negotiating forum lies in the establishment of international peace and security. That fact imposes on all members and observers alike the responsibility to contribute effectively to creating an appropriate and fertile climate at this negotiating forum which will

ensure that the negotiation is sufficiently fruitful to strengthen the objectives and aspirations of humanity at large. While the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament expresses the international community's need to establish a more secure, more peaceful and more stable world, it also expresses the nature of the fears surrounding the peoples of the world. Nevertheless, my delegation had hoped that the process of negotiation at this forum would move forward more quickly than is the case now, and that it would be more in keeping with the real international need to adopt international conventions on the prevention of nuclear proliferation, on the comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, and on halting the production of fissile material used in the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. If we have not succeeded thus far in adopting the basic provisions of treaties dealing with the aforementioned topic, then when do we expect to arrive at treaties requiring the total elimination and destruction of existing nuclear arsenals, which are liable to proliferate in various regions of the world and which threaten its entire people?

It is true that there is talk about security guarantees, and it is also true that there is limited readiness on the part of nuclear-weapon States to give guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons. All that is true, but does it eliminate the terror felt by the majority? In my view, the answer is regrettably in the negative. This further complicates the issue, and leads to nuclear proliferation and to the spread of weapons of mass destruction to other regions. Against the background of this reality, we must therefore affirm confidence-building measures among countries within the global framework of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as at the regional level. With a view to guaranteeing a state of stability in the Middle East that strengthens international peace and security, we must exert efforts and move towards pushing the idea of establishing a zone free from weapons of mass destruction. The same can also be applied to the world's other hotbeds of tension. My own country, Iraq, is seriously concerned to take the proper technical and legal steps to implement Security Council resolutions and to declare various initiatives to normalize the situation in the region.

On the other hand, my delegation, in common with several others, attaches great importance to expanding the membership of the Conference as a negotiating forum in which everyone can contribute to achieving the objective for which we are working, namely the strengthening of international peace and security. We believe that this matter has come to be largely and directly linked to finding the appropriate means of expanding the membership of the Conference. In this respect, during the Conference's session in 1993 the Special Coordinator concerned with the item on the expansion of the membership of the Conference proposed a solid basis for helping the Conference to emerge from this dilemma. We also wish Ambassador Lampreia success in his efforts in that area, in keeping with the wishes of the Group of 23. In that connection, my country is keen to participate positively and effectively in the expanded Conference, particularly since it is widely experienced in the field of disarmament, having acquired firsthand knowledge of the tasks of some 100 international inspection teams, including over 24 nuclear inspection teams.

(Mr. Hussein, Iraq)

In cooperation with the Special Commission of the Security Council, it has also transported spent fuel in its endeavour to implement the operative paragraphs of resolution 715. Iraq has cooperated fully with the Commission in carrying out aerial monitoring and in taking air and water samples from different parts of Iraq in accordance with the requirements of the monitoring and observation programme. It has supported the inspection teams by providing manpower, equipment and other forms of logistical support, and will continue such cooperation based on the political decision taken by my Government in this respect.

In conclusion, I wish the Conference on Disarmament every success in carrying out the tasks entrusted to it in the service of international peace and security.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Mr. Hussein for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me and to my country. I now give the floor to Ambassador Hou of China.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): The time is getting late so I do not intend to make another lengthy statement. I neither intend nor would permit myself to abuse this solemn forum by criticizing any other countries but I cannot but make a brief statement here. I would like to inform the plenary CD of the following matters.

On 10 June 1994, the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China made a brief statement on the issues of nuclear disarmament and nuclear tests. On instructions from my Government I requested you, Mr. President, to have that statement circulated as an official document of the CD. The document has now been circulated as CD/1263-CD/NTB/WP.121. Please allow me, Mr. President, to express my thanks for your cooperation. Now please allow me to read out the brief statement by the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry for the record in the plenary.

"China has consistently favoured the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons and, within this context, the introduction of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Proceeding from this fundamental position, it has always exercised great restraint in conducting nuclear tests and the number of nuclear tests it has conducted is extremely limited.

"China fully respects and understands the position and concern of the many non-nuclear-weapon States on the question of nuclear testing. At this moment it is participating in negotiations on a complete nuclear-test-ban treaty, and it supports the idea that the negotiations should result in a treaty no later than 1996. The treaty should be a step towards the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. We call on other nuclear-weapon States to give up their policy of nuclear deterrence and commit themselves explicitly to the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. We are ready to continue our unremitting

(Mr. Hou, China)

efforts alongside the international community for the early realization of this ultimate goal."

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, as I am taking the floor for the first time at the second session, my delegation would like to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency for this month.

This morning the representative of South Korea spoke about the nuclear issues on the Korean peninsula, and in doing so, he completely inverted the issue. Therefore, I would briefly like to take the floor on this matter.

The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula has been created over three decades ago, and this is well known, by the introduction of foreign nuclear weapons on the soil of South Korea by the South Korean authorities. It endangered the peace and security of the Korean peninsula as well as the rest of the region and north-east Asia as a whole. It is well known that from this situation, the South Korean authorities have always opposed disarmament and denuclearization proposals set forth by my Government in the past. I will not mention here in detail the ambitions of the nuclear programmes by the South Korean authorities in the past and also now. Furthermore, the South Korean authorities recently consistently and persistently attempted to prevent the solution, particularly the peaceful solution of nuclear issues on the Korean peninsula. It is well known how much they endeavoured to prevent the negotiations by setting forth certain conditions and begging for sanctions. Even this morning, he brought the issue to this disarmament forum. The process is very clear - it is nothing but the same method. As is well known to all delegations and to the world, now there are new possibilities to solve these nuclear problems peacefully through negotiations and everybody welcomes this, but it is very strange and I am surprised to hear that bringing these issues to the multilateral negotiations forum attempted to distort the situation and the truth of the facts. The South Korean authorities should not continue such behaviour. They should refrain and give up completely activities preventing the peaceful solution of the nuclear issue. They are using the issue for confrontation between North and South. They should not utilize these nuclear issues thus aggravating the confrontation between North and South instead of pursuing the reunification of the nation. My delegation plans to take the floor at the next plenary, but I just wanted to make some preliminary comments on the statements made by the representative of South Korea. At the next plenary meeting, my delegation will state our position on these issues under review at the present session.

The PRESIDENT: This concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? If not, we can proceed on to the next item and I would just like to turn at this stage to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat, containing the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. This timetable has been prepared, as in the past, in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and may be changed, if

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt it. Ambassador Weston has the floor.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I simply have a question about it. I wondered if the secretariat (and I appreciate their problems in trying to force a quart into a pint pot) could explain to us why they have placed the open-ended consultations on the review of the CD's agenda on Tuesday afternoon rather than following plenary on Thursday, which is the traditional slot for that sort of consultation. I must confess that I raise the issue because I have a problem about attending personally on Tuesday and I would very much like to be there for these important consultations.

The PRESIDENT: I give the floor to Mr. Bensmail, who will answer your question.

Mr. BENSMAIL (Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference)(translated from French): In answer to the question put by the Ambassador of the United Kingdom, I would simply like to say that trying to schedule a meeting after the plenary, which will be the last Conference on Disarmament plenary for the second part of the session, is always very difficult, since it is impossible to know in advance how many speakers will wish to take the floor. The programme of meetings before you was compiled in cooperation with the Swedish delegation, which felt that Tuesday afternoon was a good solution.

The PRESIDENT: I trust that clarifies the situation. The distinguished representative of Cuba has the floor.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Just to say that Monday morning is blank and perhaps that could be a slot that could accommodate the interests of the delegations.

The PRESIDENT: I again turn to Mr. Bensmail on the point raised by Cuba.

Mr. BENSMAIL (Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference): I think it is unfair to turn to me on this matter! I think this is a matter for the delegations. I said, and I think the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Petrovsky, also said, that we are not making full use of the 10 weekly meetings with full services available to the Conference. I think that it is now up to the members of the Conference to decide on whether to use the Monday morning or not. The Monday morning slot is available.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Bensmail; I just wanted reconfirmation or re-reconfirmation on this from you just for clarification. The Monday morning slot where conference services are available has proved difficult because certain other consultations are being held on that morning and we are trying to work on that. We hoped that in time a slot would become available but this was something which was still in a "work-out" process and I know that on this particular

occasion, a special effort was made to utilize it but we did not succeed and so I would request Sir Michael to bear with us on this particular occasion.

I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sweden.

Mr. ROTH (Sweden): As my Ambassador is the Chairman of the open-ended consultations, I would just like to point out that we are flexible and could accept Monday morning or Tuesday afternoon after the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on outer space or on Thursday after plenary. However, I can see the risk of having little time left after the plenary next Thursday.

The PRESIDENT: I would suggest that we keep to the timetable as already developed because we have tried utilization of the Monday morning slot without success. There are some problems there and I think on this occasion at least, we should go through with it as it is, but I appreciate the thought of flexibility on your side. So, if it is agreed, we may perhaps accept the timetable of meetings as developed.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Before we conclude our business for the day, I would just like to make a few concluding remarks because this is the last occasion on which India will be occupying the presidency in the plenary in the CD during this period. I would just like to mention that my work as President has been smooth thanks to the large measure of excellent work done by my predecessors. It has indeed been an honour to preside over this Conference, as disarmament is an issue to which my country attaches the highest importance and because this body comprises such a wealth of talent and expertise on matters related to disarmament. The second part of the session of this Conference will be coming to an end on 1 July; much work has been done in this session, especially in the working groups, in the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB where a large number of working papers have been submitted on various issues. Good progress has also been made under the dynamic leadership of the chairmen of the working groups, Ambassadors Hoffmann and Dembinski; their Friends of the Chair have done excellent work; Ambassador Marín Bosch, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB, is continuing his consultations on his rolling text and we support him in all his endeavours. Purposeful discussions have also taken place in the ad hoc committees on transparency in armaments, negative security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Chairmen of these ad hoc committees also deserve full credit for performing their tasks with their customary distinction. During my presidency I have had the occasion to consult the Special Coordinators on "cut-off" and on the review of the agenda, as well as the Friends of the Chair on the expansion of membership of the CD. Ambassador Shannon of Canada, the Special Coordinator on "cut-off", has already met the groups. I learned that Ambassador Norberg of Sweden, the Special Coordinator on the agenda, is continuing his consultations and plans to hold his first meeting shortly. Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil has also been active and is consulting delegations on the important issue of expansion. My best wishes go to the special coordinators and Friends of

(The President)

the Chair on expansion of membership of the Conference for successful completion of their tasks. I would like to convey my gratitude to the Group Coordinators and to the delegation of China for the constant support and advice they have given me. I would also like to particularly thank the Secretary-General and Mr. Bensmail, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, and his colleagues for the excellent and efficient manner in which they have helped us in our tasks. I would also like to wish Ambassador Brotodiningrat of Indonesia all success in his task which he will be taking up next week and I assure him of my fullest cooperation in his work as President and in his work even when he will not be President.

We have completed our order of business for today. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held as usual on Thursday, 30 June 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.